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State, Islam, and Religious Liberty in Modern Turkey:
Reconfiguration of Religion in the Public Sphere
Talip Kucukcan∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Turkey occupies a unique place among the modern nation states.
Not only from a geopolitical point of view but also from cultural and
religious points of view; Turkey lies at the crossroads between
Eastern and Western interests. The political and cultural identity of
modern Turkey emerged under the influence of domestic and
external forces that existed in and around Turkey throughout the
centuries. Since modern Turkey was established on the ruins of the
Ottoman Empire, periods of conflict and cooperation between
Turkey and other political entities, such as Europe and the Middle
East, have led to the development of the modern Turkish state and
influenced its move toward modernization.
The establishment of a modern Turkey based on Western
political models was a watershed in Turkey’s history as an Islamic
empire. The early republican elite distanced themselves from the
cultural and ideological heritage of the Ottoman Empire and laid the
foundational elements of modernization and westernization.1 These
foundational elements were vastly embraced and expanded by the
early republican elite circles in the formative period of modern

∗ Associate Professor of Sociology, The TDV Center for Islamic Studies (ISAM), Istanbul,
Turkey; former Research Fellow, Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations (CRER), University of
Warwick, Coventry, United Kingdom. An earlier version of this article was first presented at the
Ninth Annual International Law and Religion Symposium: “New Impulses in the Interaction of
Law and Religion,” J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, October 5–9,
2002. The author would like to thank Professor W. Cole Durham, Jr., Professor Elizabeth A.
Sewell, and the students of the J. Reuben Clark Law School for their assistance in preparing this
article.
1. See ANDREW DAVISON, SECULARISM AND REVIVALISM IN TURKEY 87, 107 (1998);
NIYAZI BERKES, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECULARISM IN TURKEY 432, 437–38 (1998). See
generally Enzo Pace, The Helmet and the Turban: Secularization in Islam, in SECULARIZATION
AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION 165, 168–70 (Rudi Laermans et al. eds., 1998).
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Turkey.2 Successor states inherited and adopted some of the ideas
and practices of the old regime. However, even today, the Ottoman
political culture and state traditions continue to influence politics,
though in a modified form.3
Nevertheless, modern Turkey continues to struggle to find an
appropriate balance between religion and secularism in a nation that
is almost entirely Muslim. Consequently, Turkey offers an excellent
case study for those seeking answers to the following questions: Can
Islam and democracy coexist? How far can religion and secularism be
reconciled? To what extent can religious liberty, particularly freedom
of religious expression, be extended in a secular state with a majority
Muslim population? How does a Muslim majority address the
problems of non-Muslim minorities? These and other similar
questions should be answered within the context of the global spread
of democracy and the rise of religion.
This paper provides a context for addressing these questions by
providing a historical overview of religion’s role in the public life of
Turkey in Part II. Part III then looks at the role of religion in
Turkey’s current political situation. Part IV concludes that while it is
still progressing towards finding an ideal balance between religion
and politics, Turkey shows how Islam and modern democracy can
peacefully coexist.
II. THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE’S LEGACY
Because centuries of the Ottoman dynastic rule created a legacy
that no successor regime could afford to disregard, a consideration of
how modern ideas entered and shaped Turkish political culture
during the Ottoman Empire is imperative to understanding the
country’s current attempts to reconcile religion and secularism.4 This
section will begin by discussing the political reforms that occurred
during the Ottoman Empire. It then explains the millet system, the
system of religious law that operated during that time.
2. See, e.g., TARIK Z. TUNAYA, TÜRKIYE BÜYÜK MILLET MECLISI HÜKÛMETININ
KURULUSU VE SIYASÎ KARAKTERI 20–22 (1958), quoted in BERKES, supra note 1, at 438.
3. Ergun Özbudun, The Continuing Ottoman Legacy and the State Tradition in the
Middle East, in IMPERIAL LEGACY: THE OTTOMAN IMPRINT ON THE BALKANS AND THE
MIDDLE EAST 133 (L. Carl Brown ed., 1996) [hereinafter IMPERIAL LEGACY].
4. FEROZ AHMAD, THE MAKING OF MODERN TURKEY 15 (1993). For a detailed
examination of the imperial legacy’s effect on the Turkish Republic, see MICHAEL E. MEEKER, A
NATION OF EMPIRE: THE OTTOMAN LEGACY OF TURKISH MODERNITY 3–81, 372–96 (2002).
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A. Modernity and Reforms

The Ottoman Empire was an Islamic state in which the head of
the state served as a caliph who held both temporal and spiritual
authority.5 The traditional political culture of the empire, as well as
its administrative machinery, continued with little change as long as
the state preserved its military might and economic power. However,
beginning in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the
Ottoman Empire entered a period of military and economic decline.6
New ideas emerged regarding the necessity of reforms in political,
economic, educational, and military fields.7 Consequently, Ottoman
leaders found it necessary to introduce reforms into the empire’s
political, economic, educational, and military structures.8
The resulting modernization and secularization of the Ottoman
Empire occurred in several phases that were ushered in by significant
events. The earliest efforts at modernization and the incorporation of
Western influences can be traced to the impact of the French
Revolution in 1789. By the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, the Ottoman State started losing control over the empire’s
periphery. As the state lost wars, tax revenue declined. Eventually,
the state fell into a fiscal crisis.
Military defeats, loss of territory, and a weakening influence on
international politics during the last two centuries were all significant
reasons for instigating reforms. The first wave of reforms started
under the reign of Selim III (1789–1807), who introduced the
Nizam-i Cedid (New Order) in an attempt to strengthen the central
state against internal and external threats.9 His rise to power
coincided with the French Revolution, which was based on the idea
of “liberty, equality and fraternity.” Selim III invited French experts
and teachers to train a newly created military unit of 30,000
individuals.10 The flow of Western ideas that began with the arrival of

5. For background information on the caliph’s role in ancient Turkey, see BERKES,
supra note 1, at 9–10, 13–14.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See, e.g., id. at 24, 30, 33–36, 42–45.
9. ERIK J. ZÜRCHER, TURKEY: A MODERN HISTORY 23–26 (1993); see also BERKES,
supra note 1, at 72–81 (discussing reforms instituted during the New Order).
10. See BERKES, supra note 1, at 75.
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the French trainers continued through Turkey’s decision to open
permanent embassies in London, Berlin, Vienna, and Paris.11
Selim III fell from power in 1807,12 and in 1826, after Mahmut
II came to power, he carried the reforms forward.13 Mahmut II set
the direction of later reforms in the Ottoman Empire and modern
Turkey and succeeded in reducing the power of the traditional
learned elite known as the Ulema.14 He also introduced secular
education by establishing new schools such as the Army Medical
School (1827), where medicine, biology, and physics induced
rationalist and positivist thinking among its students.15 The opening
of the School of Military Music (1831) and the Military Academy
(1834) with foreign instructors,16 as well as the establishment of
schools for ten to fifteen-year-old boys,17 followed as part of
Muhmut’s reform project.
After Mahmut II’s death in 1839, his successor, Sultan
Abdulmejid, introduced a new era of reforms known as the
Tanzimat.18 The Edict of the Rose Garden (Gülhane Hatt-i Serifi),
declared in 1856, was central to Sultan Abdulmejid’s reforms.19 The
edict transformed many common cultural practices by requiring
reforms in the military, central bureaucracy, and judicial procedures20
and by introducing secular education and secular laws to Turkish
society. 21 Almost all of these modernizing reforms had some bearing

11. See DONALD QUATAERT, THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1700–1922, at 79 (2000).
12. See BERKES, supra note 1, at 82–83.
13. See id. at 97–128 (describing Mahmut’s secularization of education); STANFORD J.
SHAW & EZEL KURAL SHAW, HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND MODERN TURKEY
36–50 (1977) (discussing Mahmut’s policies and reforms); ZÜRCHER, supra note 9, at 33–35.
14. See Uriel Heyd, The Later Ottoman Empire in Rumelia and Anatolia, in 1 THE
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF ISLAM: THE CENTRAL ISLAMIC LANDS 354 (P.M. Holt et al. eds.,
1970) [hereinafter THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF ISLAM].
15. ZÜRCHER, supra note 9, at 46.
16. See BERKES, supra note 1, at 111 (opening of Military Academy).
17. See id. at 106.
18. See ZÜRCHER, supra note 9, at 52–74; see also BERKES, supra note 1, at 155–88
(following the historical progress of the Tanzimal).
19. See BERKES, supra note 1, at 152 (referring to the document as the Reform Edict
(Islahat Fermanı)). The Gülhane Charter, another document prepared in 1839, “proclaimed
the principles of the Tanzimat.” See id. at 145 (describing its contents).
20. SHAW & SHAW, supra note 13, at 61 (concluding that the edict formalized the
state’s responsibility to offer protection of the laws, regardless of religion).
21. SELÇUK AKSIN SOMEL, THE MODERNIZATION OF PUBLIC EDUCATION IN THE
OTTOMAN EMPIRE 1839–1908, at 42–54 (2001).
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on the relationship between state and religion, as they influenced the
Islamic character of the state structure, the legal system, the
educational establishments, and the political culture in Ottoman
Turkey.
The Ottoman legal system was based on the Sharia, the Islamic
legal code. As an important part of the modernization and
westernization process, the state introduced secular laws, although
the fundamentals of the Sharia were protected and codified.22 This
secularization began even before the establishment of the secular
Turkish Republic. As part of these reforms, the state adopted the
Commercial Code from France in 185023 and the Maritime
Commerce Code in 1863.24 The government also created new
secular courts called Nizamiye in 1869.25 Secularization also affected
education. For example, professional teaching colleges for the army
and the bureaucracy were opened for secular education. The School
of Civil Service (Mekteb-i Mülkiye) was opened in 1859, and
regulation of public education appeared in 1869.26 These reforms
culminated in the adoption of the constitution in 1876 as a new step
towards a more liberal regime.27
While institutional reforms took place, cultural changes also
began to take hold in society. Educated Turks began to wear new
styles of clothing and the elite adopted foreign customs and
languages. The period between 1913 and 1918 marked the last
period of the Ottoman Empire. During that period, Seyhülislam was
removed from the cabinet (1916), and the judicial system became
more secularized through the subordination of Sharia courts to the
secular Ministry of Justice in 1917.28
22. See BERKES, supra note 1, at 145–47 (describing how the Gülhane Charter severed the
temporal and religious world from one another), 160–69 (describing secular lawmaking under
the edict); see also id. at 132 (describing Mahmut II’s previous introduction of secular laws).
23. SHAW & SHAW, supra note 13, at 118–19.
24. See id. at 118.
25. See ZÜRCHER, supra note 9, at 64.
26. See SOMEL, supra note 21, at 50–52; ZÜRCHER, supra note 9, at 65; Carter Vaughan
Findley, Knowledge and Education, in MODERNIZATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE OTTOMAN
EMPIRE AND ITS AFRO-ASIAN SUCCESSORS 127 (Cyril E. Black & L. Carl Brown eds., 1992).
27. Heyd, supra note 14, at 367.
28. See BERKES, supra note 1, at 169, 171–72. In Medieval times, the Seyhülislam was the
highest ranking muftî, a graduate of a religious institution called a medrese who was appointed as
a juristconsult. See id. at 15. Because of his high rank, “[h]is official statements related not only to
matters of religious policy, but also [sic] such major concerns of the state as declarations of war,
relations with non-Muslim states, taxation, and innovations . . . and the introduction of
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Traditional institutions of learning (medrese) also came under the
control of the Ministry of Education, which modernized the
curriculum. A noticeable change regarding the status of woman also
took place during the last decades of the Ottoman Empire. As part
of the empowerment movement, primary education for girls became
compulsory in 1913, and some university courses were opened for
women in 1914.29
World War I marked the end of the Ottoman Empire. However,
on October 29, 1923, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the leader of the
Turkish Republic, proclaimed that there was “a sufficient social base
for establishing a secular republic.”30 The establishment of modern
Turkey opened a new chapter in history for all Turkish people,
including non-Muslim minority communities. The Lausanne Treaty
of July 24, 1923,31 which recognized the establishment of Turkey,
had an important effect on the recognition, rights, and liberty of
religious minority communities in modern Turkey.32
To understand the changing conditions of non-Muslim
minorities during Turkey’s transition from an Islamic empire to a
secular nation state, a study of Turkey’s history will be essential. Such
an analysis will help explain how a homogenizing nation-building
process, which disregarded ethnic, religious, and linguistic
differences, redefined the status of non-Muslims.
B. Non-Muslims Under the Ottoman Rule:
The Millet System as a Mechanism of Accommodation
The Ottoman state defined its subjects according to their religious
affiliation. This system of categorization, called the millet (nation)
system defined each religious community as a separate nation.33 The
Ottoman conquest of Istanbul (Constantinople) in 1453, during the

inventions.” Id. Notably, Mahmut II had previously recognized the Seyhülislam as a leader that
stood “above all other temporal and religious officeholders in the traditional system,” and
therefore had relegated his power to only religious affairs. See id. at 97–98.
29. ZÜRCHER, supra note 9, at 126.
30. See AHMAD, supra note 4, at 8.
31. Treaty of Lausanne, July 24, 1923, U.K.-Turk., arts. 38–40, reprinted in 2 THE
TREATIES OF PEACE: 1919–1923, at 959, 971–72 (1924), available at http://www.lib.
byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1918p/lausanne.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2003).
32. Today, the terms and conditions of the Lausanne Treaty are still valid. Therefore,
problems facing religious minorities in Turkey are still subject to this treaty.
33. See BERKES, supra note 1, at 11–12.

480

KUC-FIN

475]

5/31/2003 1:17 PM

State, Islam, and Religious Liberty in Modern Turkey

early years of Mehmet II’s reign (1451–81), was a historical turning
point in Turkish history. The conquest affected the Turkish presence in
Europe and the consequent relations between the Turks and the
Europeans. Mehmet II’s treatment of individuals in Istanbul at the
time of its fall and his policy of reconstruction were historical examples
of tolerance and acceptance of the “others” in terms of race, religion,
language, and culture.34
Arguably, Istanbul constituted an early model of a multi-racial and
multi-cultural society where differences did not lead to conflict or
repression. Mehmet II “sought to make his capital a microcosm of all
the races and religious elements in the empire.”35 He issued imperial
decrees to protect the lives and properties of Istanbul’s inhabitants,
regardless of their racial, religious, cultural, or linguistic backgrounds.
Mehmet II’s policy of accommodating various religious persuasions
attracted many Muslims, Armenians, Jews, Greeks, Slavs, and others to
settle in Istanbul as early as 1452. “Istanbul became the centre of
Muslim-Christian co-existence which lasted for over five hundred
years.”36
Ethnic and cultural diversity thrived under Ottoman rule by
adopting a policy of recognition and toleration for other cultures.
The Ottomans “became particularly tolerant and conciliatory
toward Christians and Jews.”37 Maintenance and nourishment of
ethnic diversity to promote a multi-racial society were not only
encouraged, but such diversity was also protected by imperial
decrees from within. The Ottoman bureaucracy succeeded in

34. See generally FRANZ BABINGER, MEHMED THE CONQUEROR AND HIS TIME 103–04,
412 (Ralph Manheim trans., 1978). After the fall of Istanbul, resettlement measures were taken to
replenish the population by bringing back former inhabitants and by newly settling others. For
example, Greeks driven from Morea were placed in the Fener quarter, while many Jewish families
were brought from Thessaloniki to restore the prosperity of the city. See id. at 103–04. Mehmed II
undoubtedly had religious tolerance, as Isaac Sarfati wrote in letter in 1454 to the Jews of central
Europe that the Ottoman Empire was a paradise for non-Muslim subjects, especially Jews. While
the situation for Jews in the middle of the fifteenth century was particularly wretched and they were
subjected to constant persecution because of their beliefs, in the Ottoman Empire no one was
molested for his or her religious conviction. See id. at 412.
35. 1 STANFORD SHAW, HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND MODERN TURKEY
59 (1977).
36. ALEXIS ALEXANDRIS, THE GREEK MINORITY OF ISTANBUL AND GREEK-TURKISH
RELATIONS 1918–1974, at 21 (1983).
37. Halil Inalcik, The Meaning of Legacy: The Ottoman Case, in IMPERIAL LEGACY,
supra note 3, at 17, 24.
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dealing with ethnic groups by devising an administrative system that
would allow and preserve ethnic diversity.
It is noteworthy to make a brief analysis of the rationale behind the
millet system and how it operated. Such an analysis proves relevant to
contemporary debates on ethnic and religious minority groups in
multi-racial and multi-religious societies. However, given the millet
system’s religious based divisions, its value should be judged by
fourteenth and fifteenth century standards rather than modern
standards of liberty and egalitarianism.38
As noted earlier, Mehmet II adopted an original policy
designed to establish a heterogeneous but harmonious society in
Istanbul. The millet system had a “socio-cultural and communal
framework based, firstly, on religion, and, secondly, on ethnicity.”39
This framework in turn reflected the linguistic differences of the
millets.40 The millet system was divided into communities
according to religious affiliation. Each religious community formed
a “millet” and the collection of millets formed the millet system.41
“Each millet established and maintained its own institutions to care
for the functions not carried out by the Ruling Class.” 42 Individual
millets governed institutions such as “education, religion, justice,
and social security.”43 Many currently existing schools, hospitals,
hotels, and hospices for the poor and the aged have their origins in
the individual millets.44
The millet system has been an important administrative apparatus
to nurture and sustain the multicultural and multi-religious nature of
society throughout Ottoman history. As a well-known historian
points out
The millet system emerged gradually as an answer to the efforts
of the Ottoman administration to take into account the

38. For recent debates on religious minorities, see Jorgen Nielsen, Contemporary
Discussions on Religious Minorities in Islam, 2002 BYU L. REV. 353.
39. Kemal H. Karpat, Millets and Nationality: The Roots of the Incongruity of Nation and
State in the Post-Ottoman Era, in 1 CHRISTIANS AND JEWS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE: THE
FUNCTIONING OF A PLURAL SOCIETY141, 141 (Benjamin Braude & Bernard Lewis eds., 1982)
[hereinafter CHRISTIANS AND JEWS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE].
40. See id. at 141–42.
41. 1 SHAW, supra note 35, at 151.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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organization and culture of the various religious-ethnic groups it
ruled. The system provided, on the one hand, a degree of religious,
cultural, and ethnic continuity within these communities, while on
the other it permitted their incorporation into the Ottoman
administrative, economic and political system.45

Under the millet system “[e]ach religious community maintained
its own courts, judges, and legal principles for the use of
coreligionists.”46
The millet system allowed minority subjects to develop and
maintain their ethnic identity. Greek Orthodox Christians became
the first major millet, and the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate was
recognized within the millet system.47 The patriarch could apply
Orthodox law in secular and religious matters to the followers of the
Orthodox Church in Istanbul.48
Similarly, the millet system allowed the Jews to form their own
ethnic community and to establish independent religious
institutions in Istanbul.49 The autonomy available to minorities
under the Ottoman Empire attracted large numbers of displaced
Jewish communities who were among the victims of persecution in
Spain, Poland, Austria, and Bohemia.50 While in Jewish
communities located in Russia, Romania, and most of the Balkan
states suffered from constant persecution because of pogroms, antiJewish laws, and other vexations, Jewish communities established in
Turkish territory enjoyed an altogether remarkable atmosphere of
tolerance and justice.51 Along with the Greek Orthodox and Jewish

45. Karpat, supra note 39, at 141–42.
46. QUATAERT, supra note 11, at 175. For the legal status of non-Muslims in the
Ottoman Empire, see M. Macit Kenanoglu, Osmanli Devletinde Millet Sistemi ve
Gayrimulimlerin Hukuki Statuleri 1453–1856 [Millet System and the Legal Status of NonMuslims in the Ottoman State] (2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Marmara University)
(on file with author).
47. 1 SHAW, supra note 35, at 151.
48. Id. at 152.
49. See ARYEH SHMUELEVITZ, THE JEWS OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN THE LATE
FIFTEENTH AND THE SIXTEENTH CENTURIES: ADMINISTRATIVE, ECONOMIC, LEGAL AND
SOCIAL RELATIONS AS REFLECTED IN THE RESPONSA 14–19 (1984) (discussing Jewish
autonomy within the Ottoman Empire); see also STANFORD J. SHAW, THE JEWS OF THE
OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE TURKISH REPUBLIC 37–97 (1991).
50. See generally SHAW, supra note 49, at 1–36; Avigdor Levy, Introduction to id., at 1–21.
51. Paul Dumont, Jewish Communities in Turkey During the Last Decades of the Nineteenth
Century in the Light of the Archives of the Alliance Israélite Universelle, in 1 CHRISTIANS AND JEWS
IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, supra note 39, at 221, 221–22.
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communities, the Armenians also gained millet status.52 This
achievement in turn led to the recognition of the Armenian
patriarch as a leader over his followers. Such status paralleled that
given to the Greek patriarch and the Grand Rabbi.
The development and practice of a tolerant administrative
system under the Ottoman Empire made the coexistence of
different religious, racial, and ethnic communities possible. This
system was widely accepted by the Balkan nations, and it remained
in practice until the nineteenth century when, under nationalistic
fervor, the Bulgarians, Serbs, and Greeks began to revolt with a
view to establish their own respective states.53 Here one can ask the
following question: How were Muslim Ottoman subjects treated in
comparison to non-Muslims? In response to this question, the
1893 testimony of the Jewish community in Ottoman Salonica is
an interesting example:
There are but few countries, even among those which are
considered the most enlightened and the most civilized, where
Jews enjoy a more complete equality than in Turkey [the
Ottoman empire]. H. M. the sultan and the government of the
Porte display towards Jews a spirit of largest toleration and
liberalism.54

According to one scholar, “this statement likely represents the
sentiments of large numbers of Ottoman non-Muslim subjects,
Christian and Jewish alike during the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries.”55 Nevertheless, the rise of nationalism among both
Muslim and non-Muslim subjects in the nineteenth century led to
independence movements which involved communal strife and

52. VARTAN ARTINIAN, THE ARMENIAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM IN THE OTTOMAN
EMPIRE, 1839–1863, at 15–18 (1988); Kevork B. Bardakjian, The Rise of the Armenian
Patriarchate of Constantinople, in 1 CHRISTIANS AND JEWS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, supra
note 39, at 89, 89–100.
53. Halil Inalcik, The Turks and the Balkans, 1993 TURKISH REV. OF BALKAN STUD. 9.
54. QUATAERT, supra note 11, at 177 (quoting Dumont, supra note 51, at 221). The
Jewish community opened its first school in 1867, and within a few decades, its number of
schools reached more than fifty. Id.
55. Id.
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conflicts.56 These movements led to the collapse of the Ottoman
Empire.
III. MODERN TURKEY
The establishment of a modern nation-state in Turkey
crystallized the ideological orientation of the republican elite aimed
at reshaping the state and its institutions on the basis of a secular
model inspired by the West.57 Political, social, and religious
developments in modern Turkey were influenced by the ideals of
modernism and secularism.58 Since its foundation, “Turkey’s
political elites voluntarily attempted the most radical secularization
among the Muslim countries. The principle of democracy was
secondary to that of state secularism.”59 This section will begin by
providing a brief overview of the modern process of secularization
in Turkey. It will then consider the continued influence of religion
in politics, in particular the influence of Islam in numerous political
parties.
A. Modern Secularism
Inspired by the principles of modernization, Mustafa Kemal
Atatürk, the first president of modern Turkey, introduced sweeping
changes in Turkish society. Atatürk’s main aim in the process of
modernization during the early years of the Turkish Republic was
to change the basic structure of Turkish society60 and to redefine
the political community. He tried to remove society from an
Islamic framework and introduce society to a sense of belonging to
a newly defined “Turkish nation.”61 To achieve this goal, Atatürk
56. See generally Fatma Müge Göçek, The Decline of the Ottoman Empire and the
Emergence of Greek, Armenian, Turkish, and Arab Nationalisms, in SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONS
OF NATIONALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST 15 (Fatma Müge Göçek ed., 2002); Sükrü Hanioglu,
Turkish Nationalism and the Young Turks, 1889–1908, in SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF
NATIONALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra, at 85.
57. Kemal H. Karpat, Modern Turkey, in 1 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF ISLAM, supra
note 14, at 527, 553.
58. DOUGLAS A. HOWARD, THE HISTORY OF TURKEY 96–106 (2001).
59. Nilüfer Göle, Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: The Case of Turkey, in
2 CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 17, 19 (Augustus Richards Norton ed., 1996).
60. BINNAZ TOPRAK, ISLAM AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN TURKEY 39 (1981).
61. S.N. Eisenstadt, The Kemalist Regime and Modernization: Some Comparative and
Analytical Remarks, in ATATÜRK AND THE MODERNIZATION OF TURKEY 3, 9 (Jacob M.
Landau ed., 1984).
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launched a movement of cultural westernization to provide the
Turkish nation with a new worldview that would replace its
religious worldview and culture.62 Atatürk viewed the separation of
religion and politics as a prerequisite to opening the doors to
Western values.63 Therefore, secularism became one of the central
tenets of Atatürk’s program to accomplish modernization.64
As a part of this secularization policy, Atatürk launched a major
campaign against the Islamic institutional and cultural basis of
society. This attempt to disestablish Islam as the state religion would
prepare the climate for the introduction of secularism in the Turkish
Constitution65 during the single-party period of the Cumhuriyet
Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party) (“RPP”).66 Secularization
reforms, which were undertaken during the first decade of the new
republic, founded in 1923, aimed at minimizing the role of religion
in every walk of Turkish society. The motive behind the
secularization program was to reduce the societal significance of
religious values and to eventually disestablish cultural and political
institutions stamped by Islam.67
This program was implemented through a well-planned policy
comprised of three phases. These phases were (1) symbolic
secularization, (2) institutional secularization, and (3) functional
secularization. Symbolic secularization enforced changes in various
aspects of national culture or societal life that had a symbolic
identification with Islam by transforming the perception of Islamic
symbols from sacred to profane.68 The most significant
secularization reform in this sphere, the changing of the alphabet

62. Serif Mardin, Religion and Secularism in Turkey, in ATATÜRK: FOUNDER OF A
MODERN STATE 191, 212 (Ali Kazancigil & Ergun Özbudun eds., 1981).
63. See, e.g., BERKES, supra note 1, at 443–46 (describing Atatürk’s program of
nationalism).
64. WALTER F. WEIKER, THE MODERNIZATION OF TURKEY: FROM ATATÜRK TO THE
PRESENT DAY 105 (1981); Sabri M. Akural, Kemalist Views on Social Change, in ATATÜRK
AND THE MODERNIZATION OF TURKEY, supra note 61, at 125–26.
65. Ilter Turan, Religion and Political Culture in Turkey, in ISLAM IN MODERN
TURKEY: RELIGION, POLITICS, AND LITERATURE IN A SECULAR STATE 31, 34 (Richard Tapper
ed., 1991) [hereinafter ISLAM IN MODERN TURKEY].
66. Turkey was originally established as a single party state and the multi-party
democratic system was introduced later.
67. Serif Mardin, Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey, in ISLAM IN THE POLITICAL
PROCESS 142 (James P. Piscatori ed., 1983).
68. TOPRAK, supra note 60, at 40–41.
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from Arabic to Latin script, took place in 1928.69 Because the new
regime regarded language as a connection with history, culture, and
sacred scripture, changing the alphabet was an “effective step
towards breaking old religious traditions” and weakening the link
with the past.70 Additionally, the acceptance of the Western hat and
Western styles of clothing, the adoption of the Gregorian
calendar,71 the introduction of Western music in schools, and the
change of the weekly holiday from Friday to Sunday72 facilitated
symbolic secularization in Turkey.
Institutional secularization, on the other hand, aimed at reducing
the institutional strength of Islam and its influence on the political
affairs of the country.73 The basic goal of the Kemalist elite was “to
completely free the polity from religious considerations. Islam was
not supposed to have even the function of a ‘civil religion’ for the
Turkish polity; Islam was not going to provide a transcendent goal
for the political life.”74
Thus, the first step of institutional secularization was abolishing
the caliphate on March 3, 1924.75 In the same year, the state also
abolished the office of Seyhülislam,76 and the Ministry of Religious
Affairs and Pious Foundations took its place.77 Thereafter, the state
transformed the Ümmet (or Umma, the “Community of Believers”)
into a secular national entity in order to eradicate religion as a
common bond of solidarity. Finally, the Sufi movements
(Tarikatlar/Tasavvufi hareketler)78 and their activities were outlawed
in 1925. The Tekkes and Zaviyes of widespread Sufi movements such

69. See BERNARD LEWIS, THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN TURKEY 277 (2d ed. 1968);
G.L. Lewis, Atatürk’s Language Reform as an Aspect of Modernization in the Republic of
Turkey, in ATATÜRK AND THE MODERNIZATION OF TURKEY, supra note 61, at 195
(supporting the alphabet reform); Karpat, supra note 57, at 535.
70. SHAW & SHAW, supra note 13, at 386.
71. Both of these events took place in 1925. See DAVISON, supra note 1, at 150.
72. Both of these events took place in 1935. See generally TOPRAK, supra note 60, at 45;
Akural, supra note 64, at 37.
73. TOPRAK, supra note 60, at 46.
74. Metin Heper, Islam, Polity and Society in Turkey: A Middle Eastern Perspective, 35
MIDDLE E. J. 345, 350 (1981).
75. See Karpat, supra note 57, at 533.
76. For further information on this office, see ESAD EFENDI (Seyhülislam), available
at http://www.osmanli700.gen.tr/kisiler/e5.html (Turkish) (last visited February 15, 2003).
77. See generally SHAW & SHAW, supra note 13, at 384.
78. The Sufi Brotherhoods is one school of law in the Islamic religion.
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as the Mawlawi, the Bektashi, the Nakshbandi,79 and the Qadiri80
were closed.81 With the abolition of the caliphate and other religious
institutions, the principles of political legitimacy were changed to
replace Islam with loyalty to the state as the source of political
legitimacy.82
Functional secularization was the third phase of the
secularization program in Turkey; it involved two stages: legal and
educational.83 Legal secularization was designed to firmly establish
modernization reform in Turkish society. Secularization of the court
system through the adoption of Western codes was the first step
because the Sharia Law was regarded as an obstacle to the
westernization program.84 By eliminating the Sharia Law, which
governed the personal affairs of the Islamic community,85 the prowesternization elite could reduce the functional influence of Islam in
the community.
The second stage of functional secularization was implemented
in the educational system to establish a program of functional
differentiation of institutions.86 Under the Law for the Unification
of Instruction (Tevhid-i Tedrisat), enacted in 1924, all educational
establishments came under the strict control of the state.87 Finally,

79. For an analysis of this order, see Serif Mardin, The Nakshibendi Order of Turkey, in
FUNDAMENTALISMS AND THE STATE: REMAKING POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND MILITANCE
204 (Martin E. Marty & R. Scott Appleby eds., 1993). See also Serif Mardin, The Naksibendi
Order in Turkish History, in ISLAM IN MODERN TURKEY, supra note 65, at 121; Hakan Yavuz,
The Matrix of Modern Turkish Islamic Movements: The Naqshbandi Sufi Order, in THE
NAQSHBANDIS IN WESTERN AND CENTRAL ASIA 129–57 (Elisabeth Özdalga ed., 1999).
80. For the current influence of this order, see Sencer Ayata, Traditional Sufi Orders on
the Periphery: Kadiri and Naksibendi Islam in Konya and Trabzon, in ISLAM IN MODERN
TURKEY, supra note 65, at 223.
81. SHAW & SHAW, supra note 13, at 384.
82. Nevertheless, despite the abolition of the caliphate, the Constitution of April 20,
1924, preserved Islam as the state religion. See id. at 534.
83. TOPRAK, supra note 60, at 48.
84. Legal secularization was accomplished by the adoption of a new civil code based on
a Swiss cantonal code in 1926 as a replacement of Sharia law. See 2 SHAW & SHAW, supra note
13, at 385.
85. Sharia Law covered such issues as marriage, divorce, and inheritance.
86. This differentiation primarily involved the medreses, Islamic theological schools. See
REPUBLIC OF TURKEY: MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HISTORY OF TURKS AND TURKEY,
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupc/ca/cab/ (last visited February 15, 2003).
87. Michael Winter, The Modernization of Education in Kemalist Turkey, in ATATÜRK
AND THE MODERNIZATION OF TURKEY, supra note 61, at 183, 185–86; BERKES, supra note
1, at 477.
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Atatürk’s successors during the one-party period of Turkey’s early
history also implemented reforms that “introduced a certain
mobility into political, institutional and cultural life, but [they
came] at the cost of a serious break with Islamic heritage.”88
Despite the secularization efforts and the restrictions on
religious practices, Islam has remained one of the major identity
references in Turkey and it continues to be an effective social
reality, shaping the fabric of Turkish society. The equation between
being Turkish and being Muslim is a hallmark of Turkish identity.
As Bernard Lewis points out, despite the striking changes that
Turkish society has faced, the Islamic imprint still remains alive:
Islam has profound roots among the Turkish people. From its
foundation until its fall the Ottoman Empire was a state dedicated
to the advancement or defence of the power and faith of Islam.
Turkish thought, life, and letters were permeated through and
through by the inherited traditions of the classical Muslim cultures,
which, though transmuted into something new and distinctive,
remained basically and unshakeably Islamic.
After a century of Westernization, Turkey has undergone
immense changes—greater than any outside observer had thought
possible. But the deepest Islamic roots of Turkish life and culture
are still alive, and the ultimate identity of Turk and Muslim in
Turkey is still unchallenged.89

Ninety-nine percent of Turks are Muslims, and to varying
degrees, they practice the prescribed rituals such as daily prayers and
fasting in Ramazan (the month of fasting). Additionally, Islamic
moral values are vigorously upheld within the patriarchal structures
of traditional Turkish families.90 In sum, Islamic values are deeply
rooted in Turkish society.91

88. Mohammed Arkoun, Positivism and Tradition in an Islamic Perspective: Kemalism,
DIOGENES, No. 127, at 97 (1984).
89. LEWIS, supra note 69, at 424.
90. JENNY B. WHITE, MONEY MAKES US RELATIVES: WOMEN’S LABOR IN URBAN
TURKEY 37 (1994).
91. For a discussion of common and widespread religious practices, see ILDIKÓ BELLERHANN & CHRIS HANN, TURKISH REGION: STATE, MARKET & SOCIAL IDENTITIES ON THE
EAST BLOCK SEA COAST 159–93 (2000); ADIL ÖZDEMIR & KENNETH FRANK, VISIBLE ISLAM
IN MODERN TURKEY 78–169 (2000).
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B. Religion and Politics
Turkey’s transition to multi-party politics in the late 1940s92
marked a turning point in relaxing the official attitude towards
religion, thus ending the era of radical secularism set forth by the
RPP that was originally in power.93 This section will provide an
overview of how Islam has returned to the public sphere through the
mechanism of political parties.
1. The Democratic Party
In 1950, the Demokrat Parti (Democratic Party) (“DP”) won
the first election after the transition to the multi-party system,
ousting the RPP.94 While some scholars suggest that the “autocratic
rule” of the RPP during the single-party period contributed to the
emergence of an opposition that favored further democratization and
liberalization,95 others attribute the DP’s election victory to the
tolerant attitude of the party officials towards religion and to the
party’s response to the pragmatic needs of the population, including
its religious needs.96 In any event, this event underlined the centrality
of Islam in Turkish society and its potential force in shaping the
political behavior of the community.
In that first multi-party general election, religious groups
sought to influence parties by giving them support.97 The influence
of religious groups that supported the DP was seen shortly after the
DP’s election into power, and religion resurfaced more openly in
social life.98 For example, the DP government extended religious
education to all schools with the possibility of opting out if parents
92. See generally KEMAL H. KARPAT, TURKEY’S POLITICS: THE TRANSITION TO A
MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM (1959).
93. See Feroz Ahmad, Politics and Islam in Modern Turkey, 27 MIDDLE E. STUD. 3
(1991).
94. HOWARD, supra note 58, at 119.
95. SHAW & SHAW, supra note 13, at 402.
96. Turan, supra note 65, at 45.
97. Of these, a well-known example of an alliance between the political leadership and a
religious group is the Nurcu movement and its support of the DP in the interest of Islam. See
Jacob M. Landau, Islamism and Secularism: The Turkish Case, in STUDIES IN JUDAISM AND
ISLAM 361, 374–75 (Shelomo Morag et al. eds., 1981); AHMAD, supra note 4, at 11. See
generally SERIF MARDIN, RELIGION AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN TURKEY: THE CASE
OF BEDIÜZZAMAN SAID NURSI (1989).
98. Saban Sitembölübasi, Aspects of Islamic Revival in Turkey: 1950–1960 (1990)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Manchester) (on file with author).
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so wished.99 The government also established seven imam-hatip
schools in 1951 to educate religious functionaries.100 The DP
government allowed religion to enter society on other fronts as
well. For example, the government replaced the Turkish language
with Arabic in the call to prayer101 and allowed religious magazines
and journals to appear in the public domain.
Nevertheless, although political ideologies inspired by the
religiously oriented worldview began to enter the public domain
towards the end of the 1960s, such an accommodation of
religiously-based political ideologies was against the ideals of
modernization and secularization. Consequently, the tension and
controversy over the expression of Islam through a political front
grew.102
2. The National Order, National Salvation, and Motherland Parties
The role of Islam in political parties continued to be an area of
particular concern. In 1970, Necmettin Erbakan founded the Milli
Nizam Partisi (National Order Party) (“NOP”), but the
Constitutional Court banned it in 1971 following a military
ultimatum.103 The court found that the party’s use of religion for
political purposes violated Turkey’s fundamental constitutional
provisions requiring secularism.104

99. HALIS AYHAN, TÜRKIYE’DE DIN EGITIMI, 1920–1998 [RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN
TURKEY, 1920–1998] 125–35 (1999).
100. By 1958, their number had increased to eighteen. See Bahattin Aksit, Islamic
Education in Turkey: Medrese Reform in Late Ottoman Times and Imam-Hatip Schools in the
Republic, in ISLAM IN MODERN TURKEY, supra note 65, at 145, 146–47; see also Elizabeth
Özdalga, Education in the Name of “Order and Progress”: Reflections on the Recent Eight Year
Obligatory School Reform in Turkey, 89 THE MUSLIM WORLD 414 (1999) (analyzing the
development of Turkish education). In 1997, compulsory education was extended to eight
years, see Haldun Gülalp, The Poverty of Democracy in Turkey: The Refah Party Episode, NEW
PERSP. ON TURK., Fall 1999, at 35, 52, which led to the closure of nearly all the middle level
imam-hatip schools. See SHAW & SHAW, supra note 13, at 409.
101. SHAW & SHAW, supra note 13, at 409.
102. For a sociological analysis, see Nuri Tinaz, Religion, Politics, Social and Intellectual
Change in Modern Turkey, 14 HAMDARD ISLAMICUS 67 (1991).
103. See Niyazi Öktem, Religion in Turkey, 2002 BYU L. REV. 371, 395–96.
104. Mustafa Erdogan, Islam in Turkish Politics: Turkey’s Quest for Democracy Without
Islam, CRITIQUE, Fall 1999, at 25, 36.
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Thereafter Erbakan established a new party, the Milli Selamet
Partisi (National Salvation Party)105 (“NSP”), which held the same
political ideology as the former NOP.106 After the 1973 general
elections, the NSP played a key role as a coalition partner since
neither the right-wing party nor the left-wing party had a sufficient
majority to establish the government alone. Nevertheless, after its
brief success, the NSP was once again dissolved, this time by the
military regime that came to power in 1980.107
The NSP’s contribution to Turkey’s political development
ranged from instilling ideological principles in society, to the
implementation of its policies as a coalition partner in the
government. Its political stand, named National Vision (Milli
Görüs), was rooted in the traditional, religious, and moral values of
Turkish society.108 One of the party’s principle tenets was opposition
to the dissemination of Western materialist ideas, which the party
thought would shake the fabric of society in terms of the religious,
moral, and family life of the nation.109
The military intervention on September 12, 1980, suspended
Turkey’s fragile democracy and caused a breakdown in party
politics by banning all political parties and sending their leaders to
trial.110 The first election after the military coup in 1983 was a
turning point in Turkish political history, and the election results
and subsequent government policies under Turgut Özal’s
premiership changed the course of Turkish political culture for
105. On the development and role of the NSP in Turkish politics, see ALI YASAR
SARIBAY, TÜRKIYE’DE MODERNLESME, DIN VE PARTI POLITIKASI: MSP ORNEK OLAYI
[MODERNIZATION, RELIGION AND PARTY POLITICS IN TURKEY: A CASE STUDY OF THE NSP]
(1985); TOPRAK, supra note 60; Jacob M. Landau, The National Salvation Party in Turkey, 11
ASIAN & AFRICAN STUD. 1 (1976); Ergun Özbudun, Islam and Politics in Modern Turkey: The
Case of the National Salvation Party, in THE ISLAMIC IMPULSE 142 (Barbara Freyer Stowasser
ed., 1987).
106. ZÜRCHER, supra note 9, at 272.
107. HOWARD, supra note 58, at 158. All political activities of the NSP, along with those
of other parties, were outlawed. The NSP leaders were banned from involvement in politics.
108. See generally MARVINE HOWE, TURKEY TODAY: A NATION DIVIDED OVER ISLAM’S
REVIVAL 24–26 (2000).
109. See id.
110. AHMAD, supra note 4, at 181–89; HOWARD, supra note 58, at 156–65. Ironically,
although the military was known for their staunch secularity, the generals who had instigated
the coup decided to make religious education compulsory in primary and secondary education.
For the nature of religious education in Turkey, see Ali Murat Yel & Omer Faruk Harman, The
Science of Religions in Turkish History, in MODERN 245, 245–57 (J.G. Platvoet & G.A.
Wiegers eds., 2002).
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decades to come. Turgut Özal’s center-right, liberal-conservative111
Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party) launched a liberalization and
democratization policy in Turkey,112 which facilitated the
expression of Islam in the public sphere to a greater degree than
before. As part of its policy, the government deleted articles 141,
142, and 163 of the constitution113 to lift obstacles to freedom of
thought. The Motherland Party also adopted a free market
economy through a large-scale privatization movement.
3. The Welfare Party
As soon as the referendum lifted the political ban imposed by the
military regime in 1980, Necmettin Erbakan returned to politics
with the same political discourse but under a new party name, the
Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) (“WP”).114 The WP had a modest start
in 1984, and its vote share gradually increased, reaching nineteen
percent in the 1994 local elections.115 This victory gave the WP
control over Turkey’s two largest cities, Istanbul and Ankara, as well
as party control over many other provincial centers.116
The general elections on December 24, 1995, were a turning
point in Turkey’s modern political history. The elections resulted
in the reconfiguration of religion and politics in the public sphere.
The political developments soon after the elections,117 as well as
the efforts of the WP to form a government, preoccupied the
Turkish citizens regardless of their political preference or their
degree of religiosity. The victory by the WP marked the first time
since the foundation of the Turkish Republic that an Islamist party
had claimed a majority. The rise of the WP meant that the political

111. While Turgut Özal had a liberal economic policy, he was conservative in traditional
social values.
112. For an analysis of the Motherland Party and its reform policies, see HOWARD, supra
note 58, at 165–71; ZÜRCHER, supra note 9, at 298; Üstün Ergüder, The Motherland Party,
1983–1989, in POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY 152, 153–69 (Metin Heper
& Jacob M. Landau eds., 1991).
113. ZÜRCHER, supra note 9, at 305.
114. See HOWE, supra note 108, at 26.
115. See id. at 27.
116. ERGUN ÖZBUDUN, CONTEMPORARY TURKISH POLITICS: CHALLENGES TO
DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION 87 (2000).
117. See generally M. Hakan Yavuz, Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in
Turkey, COMP. POL., Oct. 1997, at 63 (analyzing governmental policy’s effect on the Islamic
political identity).
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rhetoric of an Islamic-oriented party received large popular
support.
TABLE 1: PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS AND THE RISE OF THE
WELFARE PARTY IN TURKEY BETWEEN 1987–99118
1987
(VOTE %)

1991
(VOTE %)

1995
(VOTE %)

1999
(VOTE %)

Welfare Party

7.2

16.9

21.3

15.41
(The Virtue
Party)

True Path
Party

19.1

27.0

19.1

12.01

Motherland
Party

36.3

24.0

19.6

13.22

8.5

10.8

14.6

22.19

24.8

20.8

-

-

-

-

10.7

-

-

-

-

17.98

PARTY

Democratic
Left Party
S .D. P. P.
Republican
People’s Party
Nationalist
Action Party

Table 1 shows that the WP steadily increased its votes during the
last three general elections. Since there was a national threshold of
ten percent in the 1987 elections, the WP could not win any seats
despite its 7.2% share in the results. In order to avoid such a result in
the 1991 elections, the WP leadership negotiated with the Milliyetçi
Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party) (“NAP”), which also
sought an electoral partner to beat the ten percent threshold.119 As
soon as the elections were over, the electoral coalition, which had
allowed both parties to enter parliament, ceased and the WP
assumed its own particular stance in Turkish politics.
The WP had 21.3% of the votes and 168 seats in the 1995
elections.120 After an initial failure to form a coalition government,

118. Statistics obtained from the Higher Electoral Board of Turkey.
119. This was only an electoral coalition, not a coalition to form a government. In order
to overcome the ten percent electoral threshold, WP and NAP decided to enter the elections
with a single ballot.
120. See HOWE, supra note 108, at 118.
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the WP eventually succeeded in becoming an important government
partner in June 1996, following the fall of the Motherland Party
(“MP”)–True Path Party (“TPP”) (Dogru Yol Partisi) coalition.121
As an Islamist politician, Necmettin Erbakan became the new Prime
Minister of Turkey.122
The WP’s achievement resulted from its integration into the
political culture of Turkey and its respect for Turkey’s republican
principle and legal system as well as its advocacy of the market
economy.123 Although factors such as these may have been
marginally significant, the true force behind the WP’s rise to power
was its Islamist views.124 The Islamic revival or “return of Islam” is
a much more complex phenomenon that involved social, economic,
and political developments, both past and present. Because Islamic
movements and Muslim politics do not have a monolithic nature,
the Islamic revival should be viewed within the context of a current
global revival of religion, which has not been limited to the Muslim
world.125
121. See id. at 118–19.
122. See id. at 119.
123. See Eric Rouleau, Turkey: Beyond Atatürk, FOREIGN POL’Y, Summer 1996, at 70,
76–77.
124. For instance, the party used religious symbols and language as well as antiWestern discourse. It also made promises to solve problems such as the headscarf ban at the
universities.
125. It is worth noting here that the concepts referred to as revivalist Islam, resurgent
Islam, and fundamentalist Islam drew the attention of politicians, journalists, and scholars to
the global phenomenon of rising Islamic awareness. A plethora of semi-scholarly and scholarly
literature examined different aspects of Islamic revivalism and movements of return to religious
values. Especially after the Iranian Revolution of 1979, numerous publications appeared with
differing approaches to understanding and explaining the nature of Islamic resurgence in
Muslim societies. See generally Talip Kucukcan, The Nature of Islamic Resurgence in Near and
Middle Eastern Muslim Societies, in 14 HAMDARD ISLAMICUS, supra note 102, at 71–74.
Along with many other Muslim societies, Turkey also witnessed the revival of religious values
among different segments of the society.
The westernized elite in Muslim countries seem to have failed to establish a viable
economic and political system during their long stay in power after the establishment of
independent nation-states. Moreover, they did not succeed in providing workable solutions
to the problems prevalent in Muslim societies such as poverty, unemployment, inadequate
education, and unequal political participation. In the grip of these unresolved problems,
Muslim intellectuals began to question the value and viability of the regimes in their
countries.
Islamic movements appealed to a large segment of society because they suggested that
the Western-inspired regimes had all failed to produce and sustain an acceptable process of
development. Muslim intellectuals also promoted the idea of seeking alternative sources of
development and progress in the social, economic, and political reconstruction of Muslim
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After the establishment of a coalition government with the
center-right TPP, the secularist-Islamist divide in the political
spectrum became more visible to the public. This was due in part to
the lack of trust between the two camps. Although Erbakan changed
some of his hostile discourses towards the West and Israel, he failed
to convince the secular elite, the military, and many of the secular
civil societies in Turkey of the virtues of his policy disfavoring the
secular state. His foreign policy preferences were also a source of
discontent among the secular elite in Turkey.126 Erbakan’s first visit
was to Libya and his second was to Iran, followed by visits to

societies. This meant a return to the Islamic idioms and root-paradigms and to the rediscovery
of Islamic ideology as a world-view rooted in Qur’anic paradigms.
The revival of Islam in Turkey gathered momentum after the 1980s. As mentioned
earlier, Islamic values are deeply rooted in Turkish society and despite the striking sociopolitical changes resulting from modernization and secularization, the Islamic imprint on
the fabric of society still remains alive. Some scholars attribute the revival of Islamic values
to the failure of the secular elite’s effort to replace religion with totally modern secular
values. They suggest that secularization and westernization could not perform the
metaphysical function of a religion. New reforms from the top could not provide a system of
beliefs and practices that would enable people to overcome the ultimate problems of life.
Heper, supra note 74, at 361. The early republican elite’s ideology seemed to have some
shortcomings in its approach to religion. It failed to realize how deeply realism was rooted
in Turkish society and it attempted to undermine the role of Islam for Turks in building a
national identity. Mardin, supra note 67, at 229–30. The radical secular culture attempted
to change the country’s habits, cultural values, and language. Yet these changes failed
because they left gaping holes in the areas of habits and culture and “provided no equivalent
for the widely used Islamic idiom.” Serif Mardin, Islam in Mass Society: Harmony Versus
Polarization, in POLITICS IN THE THIRD TURKISH REPUBLIC 161, 164 (Metin Heper &
Ahmet Evin eds., 1994).
To this day, Atatürk’s intention to make religion purely a private concern in an
individual’s life has not materialized because the boundaries of private daily life have assumed a
wider role in Turkish society. While private daily life increasingly gained new variety and
richness, religion acquired a more effective role and a central focus in society. Private religious
education, the development of Islamic fashion and dress, the production of religious music,
and the publication of Islamic journals as aspects of the privatization wave made Islam more
pervasive in modern Turkish society.
The spread of universal education in Turkey and the rapid developments in
communication technology transformed the message of the Sufi Orders into mass religious
movements. These movements can be described as faith movements, having new distinctive
characteristics. These developments have resisted the forces that attempted to make religion
a private matter. Social changes such as migration from rural to urban settlement areas,
rapid demographic change, multi-party politics, and economic and industrial developments
have all affected the revival of Islam in Turkey. See Naci Sevkal, An Overview of Turkey’s
Urbanization, in TURKEY SINCE 1970: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIETY 77–78
(Debbie Lovatt ed., 2001).
126. See HOWE, supra note 108, at 157–58.
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Indonesia and Malaysia.127 These visits were interpreted as a
departure from the modern world.128 In domestic politics, Erbakan’s
somewhat inciting speeches and practices as head of the government
made him highly unpopular with the armed forces.129
On February 28, 1997, Turkey’s National Security Council
“recommended” to Erbakan in ultimatum form a number of stern
measures to guard the secular nature of the state, which Erbakan
eventually signed after several days’ resistance.130 Erbakan’s own
political downfall began with his resignation from office in June
1997.131 The Turkish Constitutional Court abolished the Welfare
Party in January 1998, again finding constitutional violations of
secularism.132 The court also banned Erbakan and five other party
leaders from political activity for five years.133
4. The Virtue Party
After the dissolution of the WP, the ex-members of the outlawed
party formed a new group called the Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party)
(“VP”).134 This party adhered to a political ideology identical to that
of the WP. However, on March 22, 1999, the Attorney General filed
an indictment for the ban of the VP, claiming that it supported antisecular opinions and represented the ideologies of a banned party.135
Despite this reaction to the rise of the VP, none of the long-running
problems regarding religious liberty came to an end during the
party’s existence or during the coalition government’s term in office
after the 1999 elections.

127. See generally id.
128. See, e.g., Turkish Press Scanner: “Supporter of Terrorism,” TURKISH DAILY NEWS
(Mar. 17, 1999), available at 1999 WL 5566304.
129. Öktem, supra note 103, at 398–99.
130. See HOWE, supra note 108, at 139. For a critique of the February 28 process, see
M. Hakan Yavuz, Cleansing Islam from the Public Sphere, 54 J. INT’L AFF. 21, 37–42 (2000).
131. HOWARD, supra note 58, at 179. This resignation occurred under pressure from the
armed forces. See Haldun Gülalp, Globalization and Political Islam: The Social Bases of Turkey’s
Welfare Party, 33 INT’L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 433, 433 (2001) (discussing the Welfare Party’s
contribution to the Islamic political identity).
132. The court based its ruling on articles 68 and 69 of the constitution and sections
101(b) and 103(b) of Law number 2820 on the Regulation of Political Parties.
133. Öktem, supra note 103, at 396.
134. Army Chides Kutan Remarks, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, Dec. 1, 1998, available at
http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/12_01_98/dom.htm#d2.
135. Öktem, supra note 103, at 396–97.
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Although the VP remained out of government office, the court
case and debates about the party ideology continued, as did its
appeal to the masses through a discreetly religious rhetoric.
Through these discussions, the public sphere became more
exclusive of religion in general and the expression of Islam in
particular.
The first parliamentary session after the 1999 elections was a test
case for Turkish democracy because it set the limits of presence and
expression of religious identity in the public sphere. The public
sphere is still under the control of state ideology, rather than being
an open domain for discussion regarding legitimacy and resources on
the basis of mutual respect and understanding. As noted by one
scholar
In the Turkish context . . . the public sphere is institutionalized
and imagined as a site for the implementation of a secular and
progressive way of life. An authoritarian modernism—rather than
bourgeois, individualist liberalism—underpins this public sphere.
Religious signs and practices have been silenced as the modern
public sphere has set itself against the Muslim social imaginary and
segregated social organization; modern codes of conduct have
entered public spaces ranging from Parliament and educational
institutions to the street and public transportation.136

In the 1999 general elections, political alliances, and the
balance of power changed dramatically. As Table 1 shows, the VP,
the WP’s successor, lost strength in these elections. The tension
that emerged between Islamists and secularists during the WP’s
short term in office caused many voters to turn to the Democratic
Left Party and the right-wing National Action Party, both of which
kept religious issues out of election campaigns. Both parties also
directly or indirectly put more emphasis on the nationalist
sentiments of the masses, a strategy that earned them more seats in
the parliament.
Additionally in 1999, Kavakçi was elected a member of the
parliament as a veiled woman.137 Kavakçi tried to enter the
Parliament to be sworn in but faced outright resistance from Prime
Minister Bülent Ecevit and deputies of his Social Democratic Party,
136. Nilüfer Göle, Islam in Public: New Visibilities and New Imaginaries, 14 PUB.
CULTURE 173, 176–77 (2002).
137. Until that election, no veiled woman had been elected to parliament.
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who saw her Islamic veiling as a challenge to the implicit rules of
Parliament. Thus, Kavakçi could not take her seat in the parliament
and lost her Turkish nationality on the grounds that she had
become a U.S. national before obtaining approval from Turkish
authorities.138
5. Current political parties
While the “unspoken, implicit borders and the stigmatizing,
exclusionary power of the secular public sphere” consolidated its
power, the Constitutional Court banned the VP on June 22,
2001, “on charges of being a center of Islamic fundamentalism”
and for being a “focal point” for anti-secular activities.139 Soon
after the end of the VP, the Saadet Partisi (Prosperity Party)
(“PP”) began representing the traditional old ideology.140
However, divisions of opinion within the party caused a
breakdown in the rank and file of the party, ultimately resulting in
the establishment of the Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and
Development Party) (“JDP”) under the leadership of Recep
Tayyip Erdogan, previous mayor of Istanbul.141 As shown in Table
2, JDP won the November 3, 2002, early elections with 34.28% of
the vote and claimed a majority in the parliament. Erdogan,

138. See Ilnur Cevik, It’s Time We Solve the Merve Puzzle, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, Nov.
23, 1999, available at http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/11_23_99/
comment.htm; Headscarf Controversy Dominates Agenda as the New Parliament Convenes,
TURKISH DAILY NEWS, May 1, 1999, available at http://www.turkishdailynews.com/
old_editions/05_02_99/dom.htm#d5. The ban on wearing a scarf in public spaces such as
universities and government offices still continues. In some instances, extreme measures ensure
against women wearing a headscarf, as illustrated by an event which involved a very old female
patient who was refused admittance into Istanbul University’s hospital because she was wearing
a headscarf. Öktem, supra note 103, at 397–98.
139. Constitutional Court Bans Virtue Party, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, June 23, 2001,
available at http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/06_23_01/dom.htm; Chris
Morris, Turkey Faces EU Wrath as Court Bans Islamic Party, THE GUARDIAN, June 23, 2001,
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,511377,00.html; Öktem,
supra note 103, at 398.
140. See generally BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2002: TURKEY (2002),
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2002/13986.htm (last visited February 15, 2003)
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2002].
141. See generally id.

499

KUC-FIN

5/31/2003 1:17 PM

[2003

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

though, remained out of the parliament because he was banned
from politics at the time of the elections.142
TABLE 2: NOVEMBER 3, 2002—ELECTION RESULTS143
PARTY
Justice and Development
Party
Republican People’s Party
True Path Party
Nationalist Action Party
Youth Party
Democratic People’s Party
Motherland Party
Prosperity Party
Democratic Left Party
Other and independent

PERCENT OF
VOTE

NUMBER OF
DEPUTIES

34.28

363

19.39
9.54
8.36
7.25
6.22
5.13
2.49
1.22
9.27

178
1
7

The JDP leadership has been very reluctant to take a stand on the
state-religion relationship and secularism. Party officials refrain from
talking about current problems regarding restrictions on expression of
religion in the public sphere to avoid increasing the tension between
the secular and the more religiously oriented sections of society. For
instance, Erdogan and other party officials have emphasized that the
prohibition on wearing a headscarf would not be their priority in the
office, arguing that this problem can only be solved through a social
and political consensus, rather than by causing conflict and tension.
Since the establishment of the JDP government in November 2002,
the government has focused not on restriction on religion, but on
broader issues, such as Turkey’s entry into the European Union,
democratization reforms, economic progress, and the recent regional
crisis involving Iraq. The JDP government not only remained silent

142. Erdogan was banned because of his previous conviction and jail sentence for reading a
poem that allegedly incited religious hatred among the people. See HOWE, supra note 108, at
192. It was only after the formation of a new government under Abdullah Gül’s premiership that
the parliament made the necessary constitutional amendments enabling Erdogan to run for a seat.
143. 2002 statistics obtained from the Higher Electoral Board of Turkey. See generally
DAVID SHANKLAND, THE ALEVIS IN TURKEY: THE EMERGENCE OF A SECULAR ISLAMIC
TRADITION (2003).
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with regard to restrictions on Islam in the public sphere, but it has also
avoided addressing problems of non-Muslim minorities in Turkey.
C. Minority Religious Groups in Modern Turkey
The basis for the legal status of religion and religious liberty as
well as the nature of the state are clearly laid out in the Turkish
Constitution. Article 2 of the constitution sets the nature of the state
and its relation to religion. It says, “The Republic of Turkey is a
democratic, secular and social State . . . .”144 The constitution
provides for freedom of religion and the government generally
respects this right in practice. Article 24 of the constitution
guarantees this liberty as follows: “Everyone has the right to freedom
of conscience, religious belief and conviction. Acts of worship,
religious services, and ceremonies shall be conducted freely, provided
that they do not violate the provisions of Article 14.”145 Article 24
also provides liberty and protection for nonbelievers by stating that
“[n]o one shall be compelled to worship, or to participate in
religious ceremonies and rites, to reveal religious beliefs and
convictions, or be blamed or accused because of his religious beliefs
and convictions.”146
1. Minority Islamic sects
Although approximately ninety-eight percent of the population
in Turkey is Muslim,147 Islam is not a monolithic religion in Turkey.
The majority of the Muslim population are Sunni,148 but current
perception and practice of Islam varies from mystical to folk Islam
and from conservative to more moderate Islam. This circumstance
has resulted from Turkish society’s exposure to various cultural
currents throughout the centuries. In addition to the Sunni Muslim
majority, Turkey has an estimated twelve to twenty million Alevis, a
heterodox Muslim sect.149 Alevis freely practice their beliefs and build

144. TURK. CONST. art. 2.
145. Id. pt. IV (Freedom of Religion and Conscience), art. 24. Article 14 sets the
boundaries of these provisions, which relate to the integrity and existence of the secular state.
146. Id.
147. See INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2002, supra note 140.
148. See id.
149. Reha Çamuroglu, Some Notes on the Contemporary Process of Restructuring Alevilik
in Turkey, in SYNCRETISTIC RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN THE NEAR EAST 25, 32 (Krisztina
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“Cem houses” (places of gathering). Many Alevis allege
discrimination in the state’s failure to include any of their doctrines
or beliefs in religious instruction classes (which reflect Sunni Muslim
doctrines) in public schools. They also charge a bias in the
Directorate of Religious Affairs, which regulates the operation of the
country’s 75,000 mosques and employs local and provincial imams,
who are civil servants.150 Some groups claim that the directorate
reflects mainstream Sunni Islamic beliefs. No public funds are
allocated specifically from the directorate budget for Alevi activities
or religious leadership.151
2. Non-Muslims
Several non-Muslim religious groups exist in Turkey, most of
which are concentrated in Istanbul and other large cities. Since
census results do not contain any data pertaining to the religious
affiliation of Turkish citizens, the exact membership figures are not
available. However, as Table 3 indicates, it is estimated that there are
more than one hundred thousand non-Muslims in Turkey.
TABLE 3: ESTIMATED NUMBER OF NON-MUSLIMS152
RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION
NUMBER
Armenian Orthodox Christians
Jews
Greek Orthodox Christians
Syrian Orthodox (Syriac) Christians
Baha’is
Protestants

50,000
25,000
3,000–5,000
15,000
10,000
3,000

Kehl-Bodrogi et al. eds., 1997); INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2002, supra
note 140.
Turkish Alevi rituals include men and women worshipping together through speeches,
poetry, and dance. See ALEVI IDENTITY: CULTURAL, RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES
(Tord Olsson et al. eds., 1998). Alevis also do not have a monolithic structure. Like the Sunni
majority, the Alevi community has a diversity of interpretations and dozens of competing
associations, which reflect the varieties of Islam in Turkish society. See generally ILYAS ÜZÜM,
GÜNÜMÜZ ALEVILIGI [CONTEMPORARY ALEVISM] (1997).
150. For Alevi doctrines and beliefs, see ILYAS ÜZÜM, KULTUREL KAYNAKLARINA GORE
ALEVILIK [ALEVISM ACCORDING TO ITS CULTURAL SOURCES] (2002).
151. Nilüfer Göle, Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The Making of Elites and Counterelites, 51 MIDDLE E. J. 46 (1997).
152. INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2002, supra note 140.
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Armenian Orthodox Christians, Jews,153 and Greek Orthodox
adherents are recognized by the government as having special legal
minority community status under the 1923 Lausanne Treaty.
However, Baha’is, Syrian Orthodox (Syriac) Christians,154
Protestants,155 Bulgarian,156 Chaldean,157 Nestorian, Georgian, and
Maronite Christians do not have the same status. Article 39 of the
Treaty of Lausanne guarantees equality among Turkish citizens
regardless of their religious conviction: “Turkish nationals belonging
to non-Moslem minorities will enjoy the same civil and political
rights as Moslems. All the inhabitants of Turkey, without distinction
of religion, shall be equal before the law.”158
Article 40 of the Lausanne Treaty further stipulates that
Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall enjoy
the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other Turkish
nationals. In particular, they shall have an equal right to establish,
manage and control at their own expense, any charitable, religious
and social institutions, any schools and other establishments for
instruction and education, with the right to use their own language
and to exercise their own religion freely therein.159

Article 42 reaffirms this proposition:
The Turkish Government undertakes to grant full protection to
the churches, synagogues, cemeteries, and other religious

153. For the history of Jews in modern Turkey, see generally AVNER LEVI, TÜRKIYE
CUMHURIYETI’NDE YAHUDILER: HUKUKI VE SIYASI DURUMLARI [JEWS IN THE REPUBLIC OF
TURKEY: THEIR LEGAL AND POLITICAL STATUS] (1996); and MOSHE SEVILLA-SHARON,
TÜRKIYE YAHUDILERI [JEWS OF TURKEY] (1992).
154. For the history and current position of Syriacs in Turkey, see generally YAKUP BILGE,
GEÇMISTEN GÜNÜMÜZE SÜRYANILER [SYRIACS FROM PAST TO PRESENT] (2001); YAKUP
BILGE, SÜRYANILER: ANADOLUNUN SOLAN RENGI [SYRIACS: FADING COLOR OF TURKEY]
(1996); and AZIZ GÜNEL, TÜRK SÜRYANILER TARIHI [HISTORY OF TURKISH SYRIACS] (1970).
155. For the recent developments in Protestant Churches in Turkey, see MUSTAFA
NUMAN MALKOÇ, ISTANBUL’DAKI PROTESTAN KILISELER [PROTESTANT CHURCHES IN
ISTANBUL] (1999).
156. See generally ELCIN MACAR, ISTANBUL’UN YOK OLMUS IKI CEMAATI: DOGU
GRITLI KATOLIK RUMLAR VE BULGARLAR [TWO LOST COMMUNITIES OF ISTANBUL: GREEK
CATHOLICS FROM EASTERN CRETE AND BULGARIANS] (2002).
157. See generally KADIR ALBAYRAK, KELDANILER VE NASTURILER [CHALDEANS AND
NESTORIANS] (1997).
158. Convention Respecting the Regime of the Straits and Other Instruments Signed at
Lausanne, July 24, 1923, art. 39, 2 THE TREATIES OF PEACE 1919–1923 (1924), available at
http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1918p/lausanne.html (last visited May 26, 2003).
159. Id. art. 40.
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establishments of the above-mentioned minorities. All facilities and
authorisation will be granted to the pious foundations, and to the
religious and charitable institutions of the said minorities at present
existing in Turkey, and the Turkish Government will not refuse, for
the formation of new religious and charitable institutions, any of
the necessary facilities which are guaranteed to other private
institutions of that nature.160

In spite of these constitutional provisions, non-Muslim
minorities in Turkey have faced property ownership restrictions.161
On January 3, 2003, the law pertaining to the property of
community (non-Muslims minority) foundations was amended,
lifting strict restrictions and enabling these foundations to have more
freedom in keeping, maintaining, and purchasing new premises.
According to the new law ratified by the parliament, community
foundations will be able to purchase new property for religious,
social, cultural, and educational functions, as well as for providing
health services by the permission of the Office of Foundations, under
more flexible conditions.162
Additionally, since the adoption of the Law on Unification of
Instruction in 1924, education, including religious education, has
been under the supervision of the state.163 In 1997, the state began
requiring eight years of primary school education, which includes
religious instruction. However, upon written verification of their
non-Muslim background, minorities “recognized” by the
government under the 1923 Lausanne Treaty (Greek Orthodox,
Armenian Orthodox, and Jewish) are exempt from Muslim religious

160. Id. art. 42.
161. The Office of Foundations (Vakiflar Genel Mudurlugu) restricts activities such as
renovation and expansion of places of worship and other institutions belonging to non-Muslim
religious groups. The Office of Foundations recognizes 160 “minority foundations” including
“Greek Orthodox (approximately 70 sites), Armenian Orthodox (approximately 50), and
Jewish (20), as well as Syrian Christian, Chaldean, Bulgarian Orthodox, Georgian, and Maroni
foundations.” INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2002, supra note 140.
162. See Avrupa Birligi, AB Uyum Paketi Yürürlüge Girdi (Jan. 1, 2003) (Turkish), at
http://www.hurriyetim.com.tr/haber/0,,sid~342@nvid~218558,00.asp.
163. Article 24 of the constitution states
Education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be conducted under State
supervision and control. Instruction in religious culture and moral education shall be
compulsory in the curricula of primary and secondary schools. Other religious
education and instruction shall be subjected to the individual’s own desire, and in
the case of minors, to the request of their legal representatives.
TURK. CONST. pt. IV (Freedom of Religion and Conscience), art. 24.
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instruction.164 Other non-Muslim minorities, such as Catholics,
Protestants, and Syriac Christians are not legally exempted; however,
in practice, they may obtain exemptions.
One of the long running issues regarding organizational and
educational religious liberty in Turkey for a non-Muslim community
is the case of the Halki seminary on the island of Heybeliada in the
Sea of Marmara. “The seminary has been closed since 1971, when
the State nationalized all private institutions of higher learning.”165
“The Ecumenical Patriarch in Istanbul continues to seek to reopen
the Halki seminary” to educate religious leaders and to train new
clergy to serve the Greek Orthodox community.166 To meet the
training needs for Greek Orthodox clergy, Faculty of Divinity at the
University of Istanbul opened a Department of Christian
Theology.167 Still today, the Ecumenical Patriarchate has not made
any announcements or any arrangements regarding sending their
clergy for training to this department. The Department of Christian
Theology, on the other hand, remains defunct because it has not
employed any experts or scholars in the field nor has it made its
curricula public. It seems that the issues surrounding the seminary
will continue for the foreseeable future.
IV. CONCLUSION
Turkey occupies a unique place among the modern nation-states
not only because of its geopolitical place but also because of its
cultural and religious heritage. Turkey’s unique position is
strengthened by the fact that it lies at the crossroads of the diverse
cultural and religious traditions of the East and West. These multiple
traditions played a major role in the construction of the political and
cultural identity of Turkish society.
Modern Turkey was established on the ruins of the Ottoman
Empire and inherited an imperial legacy that launched modern
reforms during the eighteenth century in political, legal,
administrative, educational, and cultural fields. The founders of the
republic of Turkey adopted these reforms and accelerated the
modernization process in Turkish society. Although some of the
164.
165.
166.
167.

These students may attend courses with parental consent.
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2002, supra note 140.
Id.
See Öktem, supra note 103, at 376.
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radical reforms and restrictive policies of the early republican period
caused a cultural rupture, the fabric of the society preserved the
resources and cultural references that make up Turkey’s unique
identity.
Nevertheless, despite sweeping reforms leading to the
modernization and secularization of Turkey, Islamic values remained
deeply rooted in Turkish society. Global revival of religion as a
response to deteriorating social, political, and economic conditions
began in the latter part of the twentieth century. The revival of Islam
in Turkey gathered momentum after the 1980s because of the failure
of the secular elite’s effort to replace religion with totally modern
secular values. Secularization and westernization could not perform
the metaphysical function of a religion. Private religious education,
the development of Islamic fashion and dress, the production of
religious music, and the publication of Islamic journals as aspects of
the privatization wave have given Islam a new boost and made it
pervasive in modern Turkish society. Social changes such as
migration from rural to urban settlement areas, rapid demographic
change, multi-party politics, and economic and industrial
developments have all affected the revival of Islam in Turkey.
Although Turkey has improved its democracy since its
establishment, problems regarding state-religion relations still
remain. For example, Turkey has no separation of state and religion
as do other countries such as the United States and France.168 The
state ideology not only permeates public institutions, but it also
draws the boundaries of the public domain. Certainly Turkish
democracy still requires improvement to become more inclusive and
accommodating of religions and to find an appropriate balance
between religion and secularism in a nation that is almost entirely
Muslim. Nevertheless, Turkey is an exemplary nation that shows
Islam and modern democracy can peacefully coexist.

168. For instance, although the state defines itself as a secular establishment, it
accommodates a large state machinery called the Directorate of Religious Affairs, whose
employees are civil servants. Nonetheless, Turkish interpretation of secularization finds no
problem with integrating this office into the state administrative system. Consequently, the
directorate is occasionally accused of promoting “state Islam.”
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